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It is now common to hear discussions about 
governmental accountability, its theorectical 
basis, the rights of consumers and clients in 
enforcing it, the strategies for securing it, 
and the consequences of abiding by it. In 
part, these discussions have been provoked 
by and are a response to frontier opening 
judicial acknowledgments of rights to educa-
tion and treatment. They also are a response 
to court decisions (a) holding professionals 
personally liable in damages for treating 
patients in mental health and mental retarda-
tion institutions in professionally unaccepta-
ble ways or for refusing to treat them at all 
and (b) establishing and enforcing the right 
to treatment and education. To the extent 
that litigation has been the catalyst for im-
posing a principle of accountability to con-
sumers and the public at large on profes-
sionals involved with the handicapped, it has 
been and will continue to be welcome, de-
sirable, and even necessary. 
The Issues 
To know what accountability means is far 
from a difficult task. To make a person ac-
countable is to challenge or contest him, or 
to hold him answerable; that which is ac-
countable is capable of being explained; he 
who is accountable is held answerable. 
To appreciate what accountability means, 
however, is a far more difficult task. Ac-
countability raises a myriad of principal is-
sues: Who holds whom responsible, for what 
action, according to what standards, under 
what theories of law, how, and for what 
reasons of policy. And there are a host of 
ancillary questions: What types of account-
ability a r t now required and are likely to be 
required in the future? What types of ac-
countability should the law require? How far 
does or should accountability extend to a 
claimant of it? What interests in accountabili-
ty are asserted by various claimants? How 
are the claimants' sometimes conflicting 
claims to be balanced against each other? Fi-
nally, how is accountability to be extended 
to various aspects of the client-provider 
relationship? 
Viewed from the perspective of the law, 
none of these issues is free from immense 
complexity, although the answers to the 
principal issues seem simple. Who holds 
whom accountable? The client consumer 
holds the professional service provider ac-
countable, responsible, and liable. For what 
action? For the manner in which the profes-
sional deals with, or fails to deal with, the 
client. According to what standards? Accord-
ing to standards developed in law for protect-
ing the rights of other disabled persons, such 
as prisoners and minors, and also according 
to standards developed by professionals work-
ing with the handicapped. Under what theo-
ries of law? Primarily under the constitu-
tional principles of due process and equal 
protection, as embodied in the 5th and 14th 
Amendments, and under a new application 
of the doctrine of cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the 8th Amendment. How? By 
guaranteeing due process, by ordering 
remedies of violations of legal rights, and by 
requiring the professionals (and thus govern-
ments and the body politic) to treat disabled 
persons as equals and on equal terms. For 
what reason of policy? For the reason that, 
although humans are divisible into groups, 
human and constitutional rights are not. 
Underlying Principles 
Behind these complex judicial responses lie 
two major themes: First, human and consti-
tutional rights are not divisible and may not 
legally be parcelled out according to the 
mental, emotional, or physical attributes of 
a person; and, second, the unequal person is 
entitled to equal treatment under the law. 
Also behind these complex judicial re-
sponses lies the engrained belief of society, 
enforced at law, that persons should be 
answerable to each other for what they do 
to each other. In the law of trusts, the "pru-
dent m a n " rule requires the caretaker of an-
other's property to account to its owner for 
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his actions. In the law of torts, the "reasona-
ble man" rule requires that one person an-
swer in damages to another for acting in an 
unreasonable way toward him and thereby 
injuring him. In the law of crimes, the right 
of the public to apply sanctions requires that 
persons who commit crimes against the pub-
lic be punished, rehabilitated, and prevented 
from doing so again. 
Although the concept of accountability is. 
not new to the law, i tg .preyjOEEJ^t lg^Ll 0 
the providers of service to the handicapped 
is ef recent origin, thus prompting the ques-
tion, why? The reasons, of course, are mani-
fold. Professionals recently have made such 
significant advances in understanding and 
treating disabled persons that they are there-
by enabled and thus required to deal in new 
ways with respect to their clients. The public 
is newly aware of the needs of the disabled. 
Law reformers are engaged in the continua-
tion of old civil rights battles on new battle 
grounds. Finally, this is an age of egalitarian-
ism, an age that is capable of adopting as 
its tenets the indivisibility of human and con-
stitutional rights and the essential equality of 
all persons. 
The Right to Treatment 
The court decisions establishing the right 
to treatment have two principal goals—^e 
improvement of the condition of the handi-
capped person himself, and the improvement 
of the conditions in which the person is A 
treated or confined. The unstated predicate 
of these decisions is that an improvement in 
the person will result from an improvement 
in his environment. The unstated implica-
tion is that neither type of improvement can 
occur unless professionals can be held to ac-
count for at least the environmental condi-
tions and their professional relationships to 
their clients. 
Three Legal Theories 
To hold the professionals accountable, the 
counts have resortedlo three well known le-, 
gal theories. The first is procedural due 
process, whicF guarantees" a person the 
right and a meaningful opportunity to pro-
test and to oe heard before government may 
take action witFrespect to him. This is the 
rule that "the" government must proceed fairly 
before it acts (usually applied to commitment 
of the mentally ill or retarded). Second is 
substantive due process, which signifies that 
tjhere are certain rights and priviTigeFTKar^a— 
state may not arbitrarily take from a citi-
zen (such as the deprivation of liberty through 
confinement) and that the state may not aqt 
unreasonably, arbitrarily, or capriciously in 
dealing with a citizen. Third is equal protec-
tion, which guarantees to the handicapped 
person the same rights and benefits all other 
citizens have with respect to their government 
(including all of the constitutional rights of 
procedural and substantive due process) un-
less the withholding of the rights or benefits 
by the state is for a valid reason that justifies, 
the state in singling out the handicapped per-
son for differential treatment. 
These theories are applied solely by reason 
of the fact that the handicapped person is 
confined by the state and is in its custody. It 
is the creative application of these theories 
that is the vehicle for insuring the state's and 
professionals' accountability. 
Procedural due process, for example, has 
been applied to prevent unjustified civil com-
mitments to mental institutions (Baxstrom v. 
Herald, 1966; Specht v. Robinson, 1967; 
McNeil v. Director, Patient Institution, 
1972). It is also beginning to be applied to 
prevent unjustified transfers from one type of 
an institution to another (Kessalbrenner v. 
Anonymous, 1973). Both applications ad-
vance the principle of accountability—that 
professionals be required to justify the action 
they propose to take before being allowed to 
take it. 
Substantive due process, for example, has 
been applied to civil confinement, the nature 
and duration of which bears no reasonable 
relation to the purposes for which the person 
was confined (Jackson v. Indiana, 1972; 
Wyatt v. Stickney, 1971). If the purpose of 
confinement is habilitation or treatment, con-
finement may not partake of merely custodial 
care or, worse, punishment. Substantive due 
process thus advances accountability by re-
quiring the state and its professionals to pro-
vide habilitation and treatment. 
Finally, equal protection requires that a 
person's civil confinement be justified by a 
rational reason or compelling state interest 
(since confinement affects the fundamental 
right of personal liberty). This requirement 
can be satisfied only if treatment and rehabili-
tation are furnished, since the person is 
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classified as needing confinement on the basis 
of his need for treatment. In the absence of 
confinement with treatment, there is no ra-
tionality or compelling state interest in the 
classification or confinement, and the per-
son's equal protection guarantee is violated 
(Baxstrom v. Herald, 1966). In the same 
manner as substantive due process, equal 
protection advances a principle of ac-
countability. 
Other Judicial Responses 
T h e exact nature of the state's duty to 
treat those it has confined has not been 
agreed upon, and it is misleading to suggest 
that judicial responses to claimed accounta-
bility are unanimous. Indeed, some courts 
have rejected the federal constitutional basis 
for the duty (Burham v. Georgia, 1972), 
while others have held that the state's duty 
is only to prevent deterioration or harm 
(NYARC v. Rockefeller, 1973). Some, how-
ever, have held that the state's duty is to 
habilitate {Wyatt v. Stickney, 1972; Welsch 
v. Likens, 1974), and those courts have had 
no problem in devising the standards of that 
obligation and the methods for overseeing its 
implementation. 
The Standards 
T h e new standards for insuring accounta-
bility are those recently created by the 
mental health and mental retardation profes-
sionals themselves. They are the standards 
of the J o i n t Council on Accreditation of 
Hospitals, American Association on Mental 
Deficiency, Accreditation Council for Facili-
ties for the Mentally Retarded, and Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare 
(Rockefeller, 1973; Wyatt, 1972; ^Donald-
son v. O'Connor, 1974). 
T h e courts have been reluctant to impose 
all of the professionally created standards at 
one t ime and have instead required compli-
ance wi th minimum standards (Wyatt, 1972; 
Rockefeller, 1973; Welsch, 1974; and Donald-
son, 1974), for the stated reason that the state 
had insufficient fiscal ability to implement all 
of the professional standards at one time 
(Rockefeller, 1973; Wyatt, 1972). In what 
ways are minimum standards applied? They 
are applied principally by requirements that 
staff personnel be increased in quantity and 
upgraded in quality (Wyatt, 1972; Welsch, 
1974), and by prohibitions or restrictions on 
certain types of treatment (Welsch, 1974; 
Rockefeller, 1973; Wyatt, 1972). Curiously, 
the Welsch court recently found that the 8th 
Amendment's prohibition of cruel and un-
usual punishment had been violated by 
forms of seclusion, physical restraint, and 
chemotherapy, as practiced. Previous courts 
had found violations of 5th and 14th Amend-
ment due process or equal protection but not 
of the 8th Amendment. Standards have also 
been applied by the requirement (Wyatt, 
1972; Welsch, 1974) that individualized treat-
ment plans be developed for the residents of 
state institutions. These requirements have 
serious implications for educators of the 
handicapped, as discussed later. 
The courts may also have hesitated to re-
quire full and immediate compliance with 
the new standards for other reasons (e.g., a 
belief that such a requirement would be 
mocked because of the obvious impossibility 
of compliance, a sense that their decisions 
will be acceptable only if they can be com-
plied with). They may also have realized that 
a substantial restructuring of the institutional 
care system would be required and that they 
are not in a good position to monitor the de-
tails of the change or to oversee the imple-
mentation of massive court ordered change. 
Nevertheless, by requiring minimum stand-
ards of treatment to be furnished, the courts 
have moved out boldly to assure accounta-
bility. Whether their actions will prove to 
have unwanted or unexpected consequences 
is a different matter. 
In the right to treatment litigation, the 
courts are assuring accountability by apply-
ing principles emanating from a constitution 
that itself derives from the people as their 
statement of limitations on the power of gov-
ernment and of the duties of the government 
to them. Other governmental responses to 
the needs for accountability having been in-
adequate (i.e., legislative and executive 
avenues), the courts have been the only re-
maining governmental source for requiring 
accountability. Although they have taken 
this role by default, in the end this may prove 
to be the most successful way to insure public 
and professional accountability. Surely the 
courts can do no worse than a self serving bu-
reaucracy or an inattentive legislature. 
The Right to Education 
A nationwide attack is under way against 
public school practices that deny equal edu-
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cational opportunities to handicapped per-
sons. 
These practices include totally excluding 
handicapped persons from the public school 
(PARC v. Commonwealth, 1972; Mills v. 
D.C, 1972; MARC v. Maryland, 1974), un-
justifiably classifying persons as retarded 
(Larry P. v. Riles, 1972; LeBanks v. Spears, 
1973; Diana v. State Board of Education, 
1973; Guadalupe Org. v. Tempe, 1972), fund-
ing special education as special services at 
lower levels than regular education services 
(Mills, 1972; MARC, 1974), establishing 
separate criteria for admission of handicapped 
persons to the school systems (PARC, 1972; 
Mills, 1972), limiting the size of special edu-
cation classes and the capacity of special edu-
cational programs (David P. v. State Dept. of 
Education, 1973), and failing to provide edu-
cation to home bound or institutionalized 
persons (MARC, 1974). Collectively, these 
practices demonstrate the lack of accounta-
bility by the state to the handicapped where 
accountability means fulfilling a duty to edu-
cate both the handicapped and the normal 
pupil . 
Defined by the Courts 
The court-ordered remedies address each 
of the discriminatory practices, thus attempt-
ing to assure accountability. Statutes and 
practices that permit exclusion have been 
held unconstitutional (PARC, 1972; Mills, 
1972; MARC, 1974). Zero reject policies 
have been established (PARC, 1972; Mills, 
1972; MARC, 1974). The implementation of 
mandatory education for the handicapped 
legislation has been judicially supervised 
(Rainey v. Watkins, 1973; Panitch v. Wis-
consin, 1972; contra, Harrison v. Michigan, 
1972). Compensatory educational opportuni-
ties for the handicapped have been ordered 
(Mills, 1972; LeBanks, 1973). Alternatives to 
in classroom education have been decreed 
(MARC, 1974). School budgets have been 
ordered to be increased or amended to pro-
vide for education for the handicapped 
(Mills, 1972; MARC, 1974). Classification 
criteria have been ordered to be revised 
(LeBanks, 1972). IQ tests have been tem-
porarily suspended (Larry P. v. Riles, 1972). 
Finally, procedural due process has been im-
posed on school exclusion and classification 
decisions (PARC, 1972; Mills, 1972). 
In the right to education litigation, then, 
accountability means adhering to compulsory 
school attendance laws, extinguishing exclu-
sionary and unjustifiable classification prac-
tices, affirming the principle that all persons 
are capable of learning and developing 
(PARC, 1972; Mills, 1972; MARC, 1974). It 
also means affirming the opportunity of the 
handicapped to receive appropriate educatioi) 
(Lau v. Nichols, 1974; Guadalupe v. Tempe, 
1972; Sgrna v. Portales, TTTT), and affirm-
ing the responsibility of the state to deal fair-
ly (through procedural due process) with the 
handicapped. Additionally, erasing and com-
pensating for long standing deprivations and 
discrimination, providing a free education, 
furnishing an education to all handicapped 
persons, whether they are in their communi-
ties or in state institutions (MARC, 1974), 
and redefining the traditional 3 R's concept 
of education (MARC, 1974) all come under 
the definition of accountability. 
The Right to Access 
The increasing willingness of courts to per-
mit consumers to have access to educational 
records concerning them also serves to ad-
vance the principle of accountability. Access 
is granted under the safeguards of procedural 
due process (PARC, 1972; Mills, 1972; 
LeBanks, 1973) as well as under federal 
statutes (P.L. 93-380, Sec. 513) and state 
statutes (e.g., General Assembly of North 
Carolina, Ch. 1293, 1973 S.L., 2nd Sess.) for 
reasons of accountability. 
It is appropriate for educators to collect 
information so that they can better know 
what a pupil's needs are and can make better 
judgments about what is in his best interest. 
However, the pupil also has an interest in 
the information and is entitled to access to it 
to insure that it is correct and that decisions 
based on it are justified by it. Without access 
he is unable to hold the professional ac-
countable, and professional efforts at denying 
access may often be correctly seen as resist-
ance to accountability. 
In light of such resistance it may be salu-
tory to provide a statutory remedy that grants 
not merely the right of access, copying, clari-
fication, and expunction but also grounds for 
the civil action of mandamus (court ordered 
access) and a misdemeanor level criminal 
sanction. By the same token, the disclosure 
of information, without the justification of 
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necessity for treatment or placement deci-
sions, for example, likewise is hard to tolerate 
on grounds of acceptable professional con-
duct. A technique for assuring professional-
ism and accountability for unjustified disclo-
sure has been a lawsuit for invasion of pri-
vacy, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary 
relationship, or defamation. However, since 
damages are usually difficult to prove in such 
cases and since the legal elements of any of 
these actions are sometimes hard to satisfy, a 
misdemeanor level crime might be a more 
effective technique. 
The Rights of the Individual 
Accountability as imposed by the courts in 
right to education litigation minimally means 
requiring the state to do what it has under-
taken to do—provide an appropriate educa-
tion to all pupils, including the handicapped. 
It means more than this, however. The re-
quirements that procedural due process must 
be satisfied before placement and classifica-
tion decisions are made tend to focus atten-
tion on the individual student's needs, rights, 
and interests. As the requirement that indi-
vidualized treatment plans be developed for 
the institutionalized person brings the per-
son, not his environment, to stage center, so 
too the procedural due process guarantee 
forces educators to do what they have been 
reluctant or unable to do before—to individu-
alize education. Moreover, the PARC and 
Mills requirements of appropriate educa-
tional placement likewise carry the implica-
tion of individualized education. It hardly 
overstates the case to assert that right to 
education litigation will revolutionize the 
educational practice of treating students as 
members of a group or as components in an 
aggregated consumer group. 
The Goal 
There is a unifying theme to these judicial 
efforts. T h e new theme is that education 
must be child centered rather than system 
centered. T o assert this is one thing; to in-
sure it is altogether another. School systems 
are intractable. There is no consensus on 
what is t he proper or sound educational prac-
tice to be followed in the case of handicapped 
persons, and the bureaucratic structure of the 
schools tends to thwart the child centered 
changes that the courts require. Moreover, 
change by the judicial route is particularly 
incremental, usually taking up one case at a 
time and, even in the class action litigation, 
being without power to insure the effective 
and meaningful implementation of judicial 
decrees. What educators, legislatures, and 
consumers have been unable to do over many 
years—insure equal educational opportunity 
to the disabled and individualize education— 
one cannot expect the courts to accomplish 
overnight. Accountability in the sense of 
equal educational opportunities for all ex-
ceptional children is still a distant goal. 
Personal Liability 
In the right to treatment and right to edu-
cation litigation, courts have attempted to in-
sure accountability by imposing rules of con-
duct on whole institutions (for the mentally 
ill and mentally retarded) and systems (of 
public education). Their efforts are directed 
at assuring accountability on a grand scale; 
they attempt to make the professionals in the 
institutions or systems accountable by re-
quiring that the institutions and systems 
themselves become accountable. Yet there is 
a great difference between court orders di-
rected at institutions and systems, on the one 
hand, and orders directed at individuals 
themselves, on the other. The former rarely 
carry personal liability (except sometimes for 
contempt of court for noncompliance or dis-
missal from employment for noncompliance 
or incompetence), while the latter always do 
(by personal liability for damages). 
Two Examples 
Two prominent illustrations serve to em-
phasize the accountability mileage that can 
be gained through actions for personal liabili-
ty. Doctors at a state institution for the men-
tally ill have been held personally liable to a 
patient for their bad faith refusal and inex-
cusable failure to provide him with even the 
most minimal and rudimentary psychiatric 
treatment (Donaldson v. O'Connor, 1974). 
In addition, personal damages have been 
sought against a doctor who performed and 
state officials who authorized an unnecessary 
or unjustified involuntary sterilization (Cox 
v. Stanton, 1974). Accountability can often be 
most expeditiously accomplished through the 
pocketbook device of personal liability. In-
deed, personal liability may effect more sys-
tem changes than all the minimum standards' 
requirements of a host of cases. It has the 
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power to personalize the obligation of ac-
countability in a far more direct, under-
standable, and significant way than the more 
usual litigation against institutions and sys-
tems. It carries power over money. 
Other Appropriate Applications 
To date, physicians have been the most 
likely persons against whom the principle of 
accountability has been applied, through 
money damages for bad faith, malpractice 
and deprivation of constitutional rights of 
liberty and treatment (Donaldson v. O'Con-
nor, 1974). Yet there is no reason to think 
that the same principle should not be assert-
ed against other professionals. Thus, bad 
faith action that fails to comply with general-
ly recognized standards of acceptable profes-
sional conduct may become actionable in 
cases involving educators (e.g., for unjustified 
classification), nonmedical administrators of 
institutions (e.g., for illegal confinement), and 
psychologists (e.g., for deprivation of certain 
basic needs, such as clothing, food, or bed-
ding, as part of behavior shaping token 
economies). Surely the standards of com-
petence and accountability that the law ap-
plies to the medical profession will be ap-
propriately applied to other professions as 
well, especially where the medical profes-
sionals frequently jointly participate with 
other professionals in making interdiscipli-
nary judgments concerning such important 
matters as confinement, treatment, habilita-
tion, and educational placement and classifi-
cation. These professionals should be held ac-
countable in personal liability for their bad 
faith failure to give advice or engage in con-
duct that measures up to and is consistent 
with the generally recognized standards of 
acceptable conduct in their respective profes-
sions. 
It may be the task of the courts to set those 
standards in advancing the interests of ac-
countability. Surely consumers will not ig-
nore the effect that such standard setting 
may have in improving the quality of the 
services they receive. 
To the end that the principle of accounta-
bility is made applicable to the many affected 
professions, the state's shield of sovereign im-
munity and the provision of statutory ex-
culpability or immunity for professionals 
should be seriously reconsidered. If the shield 
protects the individual whose bad faith ac-
tions fail to measure up to the standards of 
appropriate professional conduct, it serves 
only the questionable state purpose of pro-
tecting those who should not be protected. 
That surely is not a legitimate use of the 
shield. Moreover, it thwarts the consumer 
interests of accountability. The interests of 
immunity and exculpability on the one hand, 
and accountability on the other, can best be 
served by immunity or exculpability from 
good faith actions only. 
Conclusion 
The courts predictably will be asked to 
handle many more cases directed at profes-
sional accountability and the subject matter 
of those cases will become increasingly di-
verse and complex. For professionals who 
have acted as though they are above rules of 
accountability, this prospect must be alarm-
ing and disarming. For those who have tradi-
tionally recognized that they are subject to 
the rules of accountability, the prospect may 
be managerially annoying, but not much 
worse. For all persons the prospect should be 
welcomed, for it ultimately will result in im-
proving the social conditions of the handi-
capped. If their social conditions are im-
proved, one may hope that their capacities 
likewise will be improved. 
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